Standing Committee A

[Mr. Peter Pike in the Chair]

Road Safety Bill

Clause 19 - Careless, and inconsiderate, driving

Christopher Chope: I beg to move amendment No. 52, in clause 19, page 24, line 23, leave out 'level 5' and insert
'''level 5, when the offence involved a collision resulting in death or serious injury and in all other cases level 4''.'. 
 The clause increases the maximum penalty for careless or inconsiderate driving by doubling the maximum fine from £2,500 to £5,000, but it does not differentiate between the consequences of such driving. The thinking behind the Government's move to increase the maximum penalty was to try to give some consolation to the people, or the relatives of people, involved in an accident resulting in death or serious injury. At present an accident resulting in death which is caused by careless driving carries a maximum penalty of a £2,500 fine, whereas one caused by dangerous driving carries a maximum penalty of no fewer than 14 years' imprisonment. 
The Government have tried to fudge this serious issue, which I think is common to all constituencies. In the clause they merely increase the maximum fine without saying whether it would be applicable in a particular set of circumstances. I accept that my amendment would be only a halfway measure, but, if accepted, it would at least initiate a recognition by Government that the maximum penalty for causing death or serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving should be greater than that for careless driving.

Paul Stinchcombe: The hon. Gentleman will know that I have tabled a new clause that addresses this issue. He calls, rightly, for the clause not to be fudged. I wonder whether he agrees, however, with this statement:
 ''The culpability lies in the behaviour and, as the culpability is a negligent culpability, without any intention, it is . . . profoundly wrong . . . to impose a further sanction to mark public disapproval because of the consequence.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 20 January 2005; c. 450.]

Christopher Chope: I agree with that; it is the traditional approach. I do not know from whom the hon. Gentleman is quoting: it could easily have been a quote that I would have given when we discussed this matter 10 years or more ago. The traditional approach of lawyers has been that we should judge people's culpability rather than the consequences that flow from it.

Paul Stinchcombe: I am not trying to embarrass the hon. Gentleman. It was not a quote from him, but he is right to say that that was the traditional approach. The amendment nudges us towards a different approach. Will he go on the record to say that we should mark culpability differently where criminally negligent driving causes death?

Christopher Chope: That is inherent in my amendment. I have linked death and serious injury, because often only an act of God determines which it is.

Paul Stinchcombe: Does that mean that the hon. Gentleman disavows the words that I quoted to him?

Christopher Chope: The hon. Gentleman is almost putting on a legal, adversarial hat. I tabled the amendment to try to start a debate about the issue.

Peter Pike: Order. Would it be for the convenience of the Committee if I were to change the grouping and take new clause 4 with amendment No. 52? I can do that if it would help the Committee, as we do not want to repeat the debate. Would it help?

Hon. Members: No.

Peter Pike: Then let us not debate new clause 4, because we will not reach it today. It is relevant to make slight reference to it, but not to debate it with the amendment.

Christopher Chope: I am grateful to you, Mr. Pike, for pointing that out. I am sure that when the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) makes his contribution he will address his remarks specifically to the amendment. One of the things that concerns me and, I am sure, other members of the Committee, is that this amendment emanates from the results of a report on road traffic penalties initiated by the Government in December 2000. That report left the concerns to which I have just been referring unresolved.
The Government then commissioned the Halliday report. Presumably we get the chance only once every 10 years, on average, to debate the amendments to the level of road traffic penalties. It is a cause of great frustration that the Halliday report, which is out of the control of the Home Office, does not seem to have produced anything in time for us to be able to amend this Bill accordingly. That is a serious issue. 
Amendment No. 52 gives the Minister the chance to state for the record that the purpose of raising the maximum penalty for careless and inconsiderate driving is to cover the situation where that type of driving results in death or serious injury. We would then have two differential maximum penalties, depending on the consequences. Without anticipating the debate on new clause 4, I think that that might be a tentative step forward and I therefore commend it to the Committee. 
The report in today's Daily Express of the enormous increase in the number of people killed as a result of police driving is a cause of great concern. One of the suspicions that might be raised is that the Home Office, the Department responsible for the police, does not  want to get into a situation where police drivers who are not engaged in an emergency call—about three quarters of the incidents resulting in deaths were not related to emergency calls—but are involved in accidents resulting in death or serious injury find themselves in jeopardy of a substantial penalty. We will come on to the detail of whether that might include prison when we debate new clause 4. There does seem to be an issue here. 
The other point I would like to make is that whatever we decide in this Committee about maximum penalties seems to have little influence on what actually happens in the courts. I think it was the Road Traffic Act 1991 that doubled the penalty for driving without insurance, but we can see that there has been hardly any response to that measure in the courts. Similarly, despite the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving having risen from 10 to 14 years' imprisonment, a constituent wrote to me last week to say that she had been given an indication by the police that in a case in which her son was killed, and where the person has pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving, no custodial sentence may be imposed. I do not want to get involved in the details of that case here, but the police are taking the view that a custodial sentence may not necessarily follow from a case of causing death by dangerous driving, notwithstanding that the decision of this House that the maximum penalty should be no less than 14 years' imprisonment. That is an example of the disconnection between what we decide as Parliament and what is implemented on the ground by the courts. 
Having said all that, differentiating between careless driving that results in an accident involving minor injury or no injury and that which results in death or serious injury is worth doing, and my amendment would achieve that objective.

Paul Stinchcombe: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's speech because he is nudging in the right direction, albeit tentatively. It seems clear to me that we have to mark the loss of a life caused by careless and negligent driving more seriously than we treat a mere dent or scratch. That must be right, not just because of the emotional outrage caused when a constituent or family member dies, but to mark a real policy decision.
When we drive, we drive something that weighs between 3 and 3.5 tonnes; we can drive it at speeds of up to 70, 80, 90 or 100 mph, and it can kill people. Cars kill 3,500 people every year. In the wrong hands, a car can be a weapon—a lethal weapon. When we take a vehicle on the road, we must keep in mind the responsibility to drive carefully, lest fatal consequences flow from our negligence. It is right that the hon. Gentleman moves in that direction, and in doing so, he is agreeing with the comment of the Secretary of State on Second Reading, when he said in response to my intervention that 
''killing someone with a car, where someone is culpable, needs to be dealt with. It needs to be treated by the courts with the utmost seriousness and, where necessary, exemplary sentences ought to be imposed. We should be very clear about the fact that someone who drives dangerously or carelessly and causes the death of someone who would otherwise be alive is just as guilty as if they took a weapon to them, resulting in their death.''—[Official Report, 11 January 2005; Vol. 429 , c. 214.] 
 At least on the principle, we are ad idem. 
I shall not trespass on to new clause 4, but where do we mark the distinction between causing death by careless driving and causing death by dangerous driving? That is where I depart from the hon. Gentleman because his amendment would have the following consequence: in the continuum of culpable driving, from careless through very careless and extremely careless to dangerous, there would be a threshold between dangerous driving and very careless driving resulting in death. Where the threshold is crossed, the maximum potential penalty would be 14 years in prison, and where it is not, it would be a fine of £5,000. I have to say that that is a huge, gaping chasm, and such a gap should not exist in our law.

Greg Knight: The hon. Gentleman is making a fair case. He referred to the chasm being too wide, but I want to put to him circumstances in which the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr. Chope) would be appropriate. If two drivers are equally careless, and one is killed and the other is not, would it not be grossly unfair to send the survivor to prison for 10 years?

Paul Stinchcombe: I would not be sending anyone to prison. I propose that there should be a proper trial to determine the degree of culpability and impose a sentence that marks both the degree of culpability and the fact that death was a consequence.
At the moment, many people make a plea of careless driving, and because there is no offence of causing death by careless driving, they cannot be charged for that. The maximum penalty is a £2,500 fine and there is no determination of the facts that led to the accident because it is not necessary to determine a sentence. If a prison sentence were a possibility, there would have to be an appraisal of the facts, and survivors or loved ones would walk away from court knowing what led to the loss of life, which could be marked by the sentence. I leave it to those deciding the sentence to determine the appropriate length of imprisonment. 
I ask Conservative Members, in their nudging towards a new recognition of cases in which loss of life occurs, if they disagree with the traditional approach that results in this sentiment: 
 ''The culpability lies in the behaviour and, as the culpability is a negligent culpability, without any intention, it is wrong—in my view profoundly wrong—to impose a further sanction to mark public disapproval because of the consequence.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 20 January 2005, c. 450] 
In light of their amendment, I tentatively suggest that they cannot agree with that sentiment, but they have not gone on the record to say so. It would be good if they did.

David Kidney: I oppose the amendment, but I would like to congratulate the hon. Member for Christchurch on raising two very important issues, which have both been touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough. The first is the huge gap between the consequences when a  death leads to a charge of causing death by dangerous driving and when it just leads to a charge of careless driving. One charge results in a maximum of 14 years in prison; the other does not result in imprisonment and entails a maximum fine of £2,500, or £5,000 in future if the provision is agreed to.
The second important issue involves somebody in front of the courts who is charged with careless driving, the consequence of which was that somebody died, but because the court focuses on the carelessness, nothing to do with the death is relevant to the evidence before the court. That is probably the greatest single source of anger and frustration among the bereaved relatives of people who are killed. The issue of whether the maximum fine would be £2,500 or £5,000 is probably a lesser concern for bereaved families than the court hearing what the consequences were and marking its disapproval by the penalty that it imposes. 
On the issue of the big gap between the consequences, I favour not only my hon. Friend's suggestion of a new offence of causing death by negligent driving, but a total review of all the circumstances in which death is caused on our roads. All the possible offences with which people can be charged—manslaughter, causing death by dangerous driving, a new offence of causing death by negligent driving and so on—would be brought together and the court would be given a set of sentence options that fitted. That review should include the ability to impose interim penalties, from the moment of arrest and charge, to stop people driving until they face their court sentence. I would like to see all of that done. 
The hon. Member for Christchurch was quite right to criticise the Government for the great delay in hearing the result of the Halliday report. The knowledge and information that that report will give us will enable us to frame those charges and debate that network of offences for the future. I regret that we cannot go much further on that today. 
Incidentally, it seems that the amendment would overturn, by a side wind, all the legal practice and the law that underpins it in the courts, where the magistrates refuse to consider any evidence about the death when the charge is careless driving. If the amendment were accepted, they would have to know whether there was a death to decide whether the higher or the lower sentence applied. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues agree with the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough, although they have not explicitly said so. 
I want to ask a couple of questions about the new sentencing that would be available. Perhaps I can preface my other questions by asking the Minister whether there has been any consultation by the Department about making the change. The provision seemed to come slightly out of the blue, but perhaps it is underpinned by consultation, or by research that the Department or the Home Office has undertaken about  the effectiveness of a careless driving charge. I would be grateful if the Minister took a few minutes to respond to those points. 
The other two points that I want to ask about reflect what the hon. Member for Christchurch said when moving the amendment. First, there is currently a maximum fine of £2,500, but the fines that are imposed in the courts are usually much lower than that. Will the Minister tell us the level of penalty usually imposed for careless driving? Does the level often reach the maximum of £2,500? That would inform our debate about whether there is a need to increase the maximum sentence. 
The second issue, which comes about as a result of another recent announcement by the Government, is whether we are going to go back to an approach of unit fines, where people who are wealthy pay larger fines than people who are not. That might be in the Management of Offenders and Sentencing Bill. It certainly made the new headlines. In that case, would a maximum of £5,000 be right? The example that I heard on the news—one of many—said that whereas somebody with average earnings might face a £5,000 fine, somebody who was wealthy might be fined £15,000. Clearly, the reporter was not talking about careless driving because the maximum for everybody is £5,000. I would be interested to know whether there is a meshing of this proposal and the new suggestion about unit fines.

Greg Knight: We all have sympathy for those who have been injured and in cases where death occurs we have sympathy with the family of those who have lost their lives. Of course, nothing the courts can do can compensate a family for the loss of a loved one.
The hon. Member for Wellingborough asked for our view on the culpability test. I think that the test is right, and I do not wish to see it removed. If I understood him correctly, he was suggesting that because my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch has moved an amendment that would give the courts greater scope in sentencing, he was nudging away from the culpability test. I do not see it as a nudge; I see it as an attempt to widen the scope of the powers available to the courts by raising the level of fine that they can impose in certain circumstances. We all know from experience that cases of careless driving can range massively, from a small degree of inconsiderate driving or lack of care right up to a case that is borderline between careless and dangerous. It is quite right that my hon. Friend seeks to give the courts greater scope when deciding on an appropriate sentence.

Paul Stinchcombe: Will the right hon. Gentleman give a clear answer to the points that I put to his hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch? The amendment would not make provision for a higher sentence where there is very careless driving; it would make the sentence potentially greater where careless driving causes death. Do the Opposition believe that one should mark more seriously the fact that a death has been caused by culpable driving than where it does not arise from culpable driving?

Greg Knight: My hon. Friend must answer for himself, and I am sure that he will when he comes to wind up the debate, but unless I have misread the amendment, I do not think that it would impose a greater sentence where death is involved. The amendment would give the courts greater scope and allow them, where they deem it appropriate, to impose a greater fine where death has been caused. It does not necessarily follow that in every case where there is a death, the greater fine would be imposed; the courts would merely have the power to do that, if in the circumstances they thought it appropriate.

Paul Stinchcombe: Let us have some intellectual honesty and clarity. Under the amendment the higher potential sentence would be available only where culpable driving, whether it be very culpable or just careless, causes death or serious injury. Does that mean that the Opposition believe that one should mark the seriousness of an offence more gravely where death or serious injury occurs?

Greg Knight: My hon. Friend will answer that point, because he tabled the amendment. I am rising to support the amendment, but the basis of my support is not the basis of the premise of the question, if that answers the hon. Gentleman's question. I believe that in every case the courts should look at culpability whether or not death has occurred. An example of where the courts should be more severe is when someone is charged with careless driving, and there is evidence that at the time of the accident he was seeking to light a cigarette. That is a case that one should view more seriously than a case where without apparent reason a driver wandered near to the centre of the road. In supporting my hon. Friend, I see the amendment as a provision that would give the courts greater scope.

Mark Fisher: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough about the emphasis on death? I suspect that every member of the Committee has had constituents killed in appalling circumstances. I remember a case of a woman and her two children who were knocked down and killed on a zebra crossing, and the driver concerned got a small fine and two-year ban. We are discussing precisely that sort of case today. Does not the right hon. Gentleman understand that when death is caused, something more severe is required? He is just not addressing the point about fatality.

Greg Knight: We will have an interesting debate when we get to new clause 4. I am aware of your earlier ruling, Mr. Pike, that we should not treat this as a debate on that clause. I accept that there is a wide body of opinion outside the House that feels that, if someone has been killed on the roads, and the driver involved was, at least, careless, he or she should be dealt with very severely. Speaking personally, and not for my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch, I am not yet convinced that in such cases we should throw the culpability rule out of the window.

Paul Stinchcombe: The right hon. Gentleman is gracious in giving way. He is expressing real concern about marking the offence of careless driving more gravely when death arises, but he is not yet persuaded of the case for a more severe sentence in that situation. Does he agree with the traditional approach, which I quoted earlier, that it would be profoundly wrong to mark that offence more seriously when death is caused?

Greg Knight: That is my view as I address the Committee, but I am willing to listen with an open mind when we get to the debate on new clause 4. The Committee may be able to place on the table arguments that have some merit. However, at this moment, I have not heard anything that leads me to say that we should abandon the culpability rule.

Mark Fisher: Will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider his remark that, in the situation he referred to, the driver who died got away ''scot-free''? Is he not in danger of misunderstanding the situation and entering the Monty Python territory of dead parrots? The idea that somebody killed in an accident has got off scot-free is one that, I am sure, he will want to reconsider and withdraw on mature consideration, before he makes a complete fool of himself.

Greg Knight: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will reconsider and withdraw his remarks. I said that there was a death in the other vehicle—either the driver or a passenger was killed. It could be that a passenger was killed, and the driver of that car, still alive and possibly uninjured, was not prosecuted, so the full weight of the law was brought against the driver of the vehicle in which no fatality took place. That was my point. If I did not make it clear enough, some of the blame lies with me. I was certainly not making the comment, which would indeed be ridiculous, that if someone is killed they get off scot-free. That was not my point. I was saying that, where two vehicles are in a collision, an occupant of one vehicle is killed, and it is the driver of the other vehicle who is prosecuted, the driver of the vehicle in which a passenger died may have been equally guilty. That is not a situation that I feel we should encourage, because culpability matters.
Although we tend to find that, understandably, it is where families have lost a loved one that our involvement and help is sought, there is a cost to the other family as well. A driver may, because of a moment's inattention, have on his shoulders for the rest of his life the burden of having killed someone. Are  we saying that that person should receive a huge prison sentence in every case, no matter how minimal the degree of inattention? Currently, I do not take that view.

Paul Stinchcombe: The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that we are talking about someone who causes death by very careless driving, not simply by mere inattention. They may be driving at considerable speed in something that weighs 3.5 tonnes, and they may know that doing so could kill. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that it would be appropriate to fine someone who carelessly discharged a gun and killed someone else?

Greg Knight: I do not want to get into the issue of firearms—

Peter Pike: No, do not do that; that is definitely not in the Bill.

Greg Knight: I sure that you would shoot me down if I did, Mr. Pike. I am not convinced by the hon. Gentleman's suggestion that the culpability test should go out of the window. We should give the courts the range of powers that they need to deal with all such cases on the basis of the evidence placed before them.

Liam Byrne: Is the aim behind the amendment not simply to try to cross a chasm in a couple of small steps, when what we need is to make a leap by introducing a new offence such as that set out in new clause 4?

Greg Knight: I do not take that view at all. New clause 4 is some way down the line, and we will be able to a full debate on it. In his amendment, however, my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch is saying that
''when the offence involved a collision resulting in death or serious injury'', 
the court should have wider scope to decide what sentence is appropriate. I find nothing offensive in that. He is not saying that there should be a mandatory sentence, so the chasm has not been crossed, and the amendment has not destroyed the culpability test. 
The hon. Member for Wellingborough said that the amendment was a step in the right direction, but that it did not go far enough. He and I may disagree about the culpability test, but I hope that he will support the amendment if my hon. Friend seeks to test the mood of the Committee in a vote.

David Jamieson: This has been a short but useful debate, which has reflected the considerable concern both inside and outside the House about finding appropriate punishments for crimes on the road, particularly those that cause death and serious injury.
 Under section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, the offence of careless and inconsiderate driving spans a wide range of culpability, as we have discussed. One difficulty in dealing with the issue is that a wide range  of activities involving a motor vehicle can cause death. Unfortunately, the consequences of a very minor error can be far greater for a driver than for someone going about the rest of their ordinary, everyday life. Usually, a moment's inattention or carelessness does not result in a death, but, unfortunately, even the slightest inattention when one is in a motor vehicle can sometimes have consequences way beyond any ambition of the driver. 
On the one hand, we could have someone whose attention was caught by something else for a moment. Generally, they might be a very safe and careful driver and they might conduct themselves considerately towards others in the rest of their lives. However, they could find themselves doing something with consequences that are totally disproportionate to what they expected. On the other hand, we have a minority who drive furiously and recklessly, totally disregarding other people's safety. What amazes me is that when these people have crashes, there is sometimes little injury and damage. As we know, however, it is those very people who, by their wilful neglect and lack of care towards others, cause death and serious injury on many occasions. 
It is also well known that there have been cases of fatal accidents where an initial charge of death by dangerous driving under section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 eventually resulted in a conviction for careless driving. The Department explored that issue in our research report No. 26, ''Dangerous driving and the law'', which my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) asked about. The report has given rise to the Home Office's review of bad driving offences. We shall explore the issue later, but it might be helpful to mention that review briefly now, because it relates to this debate. 
The Home Office has led a comprehensive review of road traffic offences involving all types of bad driving, in association with my Department, the Department for Constitutional Affairs and the Crown Prosecution Service. The hon. Member for Christchurch made the important point that Parliament passes laws, but sometimes the outcome in the courts is not what we expect. However, the general trend is for magistrates and judges to impose greater penalties where fines are increased. The scope of the Home Office review is comprehensive and embraces the entire framework of criminal law concerning bad driving, particularly where death and injury occur, to ensure that a sensible and appropriate framework of offences and penalties is put in place. 
The review has considered a number of proposals to address the tragic consequences of driving that is not dangerous but nevertheless falls below the standard required of the competent motorist, including a new offence of causing death by careless driving. The review's findings will be published in a consultation paper that will set out our full proposals for reform in the relevant law. The Government are treating publication as a top priority, although in the end that will be a matter for the Home Office.

Paul Stinchcombe: My hon. Friend has heard the Opposition's argument that retaining the culpability test is appropriate, in order to mark bad driving more seriously. Is he therefore surprised that the amendment would prevent a more serious mark in any incident where death did not occur?

David Jamieson: Yes. One of the other inadequacies of the amendment is that it refers to ''serious injury''. However, there is no definition in law of ''serious injury'', so there could be wrangles about whether an injury was serious or not. I am not sure that trying to decide in a court whether a broken leg or serious bruising was a serious or minor injury would be entirely helpful. It is important that the effect of what someone has done should be taken into consideration, but the degree of bad driving should determine the punishment.
We said in our original road safety strategy of 2000 that there was more to be done about careless driving and we reaffirmed that in the review of penalties in 2002. I understand the argument that the hon. Member for Christchurch advanced, which is that a distinction might be made between careless driving that causes injury and that which does not. However, some people are properly suggesting that courts should be given scope to impose a more severe sentence even than a level 5 sentence for the worst cases of causing injury by careless driving. That will be looked at after the more careful and wider consideration in the Home Office's review. 
The hon. Gentleman talked about blue light vehicles causing injuries. Occasionally, police vehicles engaged in emergency responses are involved in crashes, which underlines why we must be careful about extending the groups who could exceed the speed limit in certain circumstances, as we debated the other day. For example, the figures for police vehicles engaged in emergency responses in 2001-02 show that there were 24 deaths, 168 serious injuries, and about 1,700 minor injuries. Generally, the trend seems to be that serious injuries are decreasing. Nevertheless, it concerns us that those in the emergency services, acting to protect us, sometimes find themselves involved in those casualties. However, regarding the hon. Gentleman's point about the Sunday Express, that does not in any way undermine our thinking. 
I think I have covered the matter of disconnection from the courts. In conclusion, we have here a small opportunity to see the fine penalty raised for those involved in careless driving, but the major review taking place outside the remit of the Bill will be far  more important. That has been given careful consideration, and will be the subject of careful consultation.

Christopher Chope: Can the Minister tell us precisely when we will see the outcome of the review?

David Jamieson: I cannot give a precise answer. That is in the gift of the Home Office. The hon. Gentleman can ask the Home Office about it. Some urgency is being given to the review, mainly because of the concern that has been expressed at the various stages of the Bill. There were some powerful remarks on Second Reading by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, and the Home Office has taken due note of those.

Christopher Chope: This has been a useful debate, and a curtain-raiser for the one we will have later on new clause 4. With regard to culpability, we must remember that the culpability test is already put on one side when dealing with offences of causing death by dangerous driving, for which the maximum penalty is greater than that for dangerous driving alone. Similarly, the maximum penalty for causing death while driving carelessly with drink is greater than the maximum penalty for driving carelessly with drink without causing death. The culpability test has already been eroded in those circumstances, as it has been in cases of assault where the assault results in the death of someone who has an eggshell skull.

Paul Stinchcombe: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I ask him once more to state clearly whether he believes that it is right or wrong for there to be a more serious offence, marked by a more serious potential sentence, when careless driving causes death, than where it does not.

Christopher Chope: I think ultimately that that has to be a matter for the courts.

Paul Stinchcombe: It is manifestly not a matter for the courts because, unless we enact it, there is no offence of causing death by careless driving.

Christopher Chope: Obviously, there is no such offence at the moment. We will discuss that later. With my amendment, I was seeking to put into words what I thought was always the Government's intention—that is, to raise the maximum penalty for careless driving by doubling the maximum fine to cover the situation where that driving results in death or serious injury. The Minister says that that is not his intention and that this measure is not meant to be a proxy for some other consideration of the whole area.

Paul Stinchcombe: I give the hon. Gentleman the opportunity again to say whether he believes that it is profoundly right or profoundly wrong—the words of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) in the House last week—that we should mark more seriously the offence of careless driving where it causes death.

Christopher Chope: If the hon. Gentleman is seeking to put clear blue water between me and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, he will certainly not  succeed. My hon. Friend is a highly respected member of the Bar and what he says on a range of criminal justice issues is listened to with great care. He is not suggesting that we should erode the distinction between causing death by dangerous driving and the maximum penalty for dangerous driving. I have not discussed with him whether there should be a similar distinction between the maximum penalty for causing death by careless driving and that for straightforward careless driving. I will draw his attention to the debate we are having, which is certainly useful.
The hon. Gentleman has accepted, by inference, that there is already scope within the law for having different maximum penalties which relate to the consequences of unlawful behaviour. In principle, if we go down the road of careless driving resulting in death—the issue of causation might be buried there—it would not be wholly without precedent. 
The Minister commented on the casualties as a result of blue lights. It was not the Sunday Express but today's Daily Express which says that the annual death toll for civilians involved in crashes with police cars has risen from the figure the Minister gave for 2001-02—he said it was 24, while the Daily Express says 23—and that last year that figure rose to 30. Also, the number of people injured almost doubled, from 615 in 2003 to 1,181. 
Clearly, there is a major and worsening problem there. That is the concern being expressed and there is a desire to ensure that the Home Office's attitude to this area of law is not unduly influenced by the police's seeming involvement in an increasing number of fatal collisions—and not always in responding to 999 calls. In the last year, the number of police car accidents was 20,221, but those involving 999 calls was only 5,940. Therefore, three quarters of police accidents did not involve 999 calls. Clearly, as the Minister has accepted, the standard of police driving is not as universally good as some people, certainly myself, would wish. 
We have opened up a good debate and in the light of what has been said I will not press my amendment to a vote now. We will reserve our judgment on whether to come back on Report after listening to the new clause 4 debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 - Breach of requirements relating to children and seat belts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Christopher Chope: I should be grateful if the Minister explained a bit more about clause 20. There is an assertion by the Government that not wearing a seat belt in the rear seats should be subject to the same maximum penalty as not wearing one in the front  seats. Does he not accept that a child sitting in the front of a car, whether with a seat belt or not, is much more vulnerable than a child sitting in the rear? It is therefore much more important that a child sitting in the front seat should be wearing a seat belt—or preferably, for a very young child, a safety seat. That higher risk was the reason for the differentiation in maximum penalties.
Fortunately, notwithstanding the differing penalties, compliance with front-seatbelt laws is high. The problem with rear seatbelts is that it is more difficult to supervise children in the back of the car, as you probably know, Mr. Pike. Often, there are more children in the back of a car than there are seatbelt fittings, and children can therefore get used to travelling in the back without additional seatbelt anchorage. 
The clause would put the wearing of seatbelts in the back and front of cars on a level footing. I should think that it is better that children travel in the back of cars, rather than the front, because they are less exposed to danger. We should not create the impression that the risk of travelling without a seatbelt in the back is equal to that in the front. The front is and always has been a more dangerous place in which to travel. Can the Minister justify the assertion underlying the clause that there is equal risk and should therefore be equal culpability and maximum penalties?

David Jamieson: The clause amends part 1 of schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 so as to increase the punishment for an offence under section 15(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which concerns driving a motor vehicle in contravention of seat belt requirements in respect of a child carried in the rear seat of a vehicle, from a level 1 fine on the standard scale of £200 to a level 2 fine of £500. This means that the penalty on conviction for a seatbelt-wearing offence in respect of a child in a rear seat will be the same as that in respect of a child occupying a front seat.
I refer briefly to our previous debate. The law will never be able to get rid of human error, but we can take action to reduce its effect in a crash. That is why we have taken measures such as those concerning airbags, seatbelts, front-end crumple zones and improved engineering of cars and roads: so that when somebody inadvertently makes an error, it does not result in death or injury. We have been moving toward that approach in recent years. We have to accept that human beings are all frail and will still make errors when driving cars, whereas, these days, the likelihood that the mechanical failure of a vehicle will cause a crash is low. 
It is important that we concentrate on issues such as the wearing of seatbelts, which has gradually gone up in this country since they were introduced. That has had a substantial effect on the number of casualties inside vehicles, particularly with children. We could have a long argument and do some academic research  of great import as to whether it is more dangerous for a child to be in the front or the back of a vehicle, but what purpose would that debate have?

Andy Reed: I agree. I speak from a parental point of view. We are strict about seatbelts for the two children in the back, but, on an anecdotal basis, all too often we see children walking around and standing up in back seats. If the hon. Member for Christchurch was suggesting that we send out a signal that either the front or back was safer or less safe than the other, the danger would be that we would encourage people to feel safer in the back and that they do not need to belt up. Those of us who are really concerned want all children to be belted up, whether they are in the front or the rear.

David Jamieson: My hon. Friend makes the point far better than I could have done. It is just dangerous for a child to be unrestrained. Even sharp braking, which one might have to do occasionally, could injure a child.
To return to the remarks made by the hon. Member for Christchurch about the front or the rear, in recent years we have become more aware that if a person or object is in the rear of the car and circumstances involve severe braking or a collision, the child, adult or object can become a missile inside the car that can injure those in the front. Even a dog could cause injury in those circumstances. The hon. Gentleman may have seen the advert that we occasionally bring back. The story is that the mother, who is driving the car, is about to meet her killer. Of course, he turns out to be the son in the back of the car, whose head flies forward, hits the mother and kills her because he was not restrained in the back of the vehicle. 
The issue is important. Children do not make choices in such things, particularly young children. They are not in a position to make a choice; the parents are, and the person who is driving the car and is responsible for those children is. The penalty for not wearing seatbelts in the rear and front of cars should be the same.

Christopher Chope: I am familiar with the figures for compliance with front seatbelt wearing, which I think are between 94 and 98 per cent. Can the Minister tell us the figures for compliance with rear seatbelt wearing for children?

David Jamieson: I probably can give the hon. Gentleman those figures, if he will give me a moment. Perhaps we can come back to it later, but the compliance rate for rear seatbelts is lower. In the case of both front and rear seatbelts, the numbers are increasing. Inspiration is coming to me as we speak. If we take the latest figures that we have, those from October 2004, the compliance rate for car drivers—who are obviously in the front seat—is 93 per cent. For front seat passengers, it is 94 per cent. For adults in the rear seat—adults meaning those who are 14 years and over—the figure is 65 per cent. and for children in the rear seat it is 93 per cent. The overall figure for rear seat passengers is 83 per cent. It is amazing how my memory can suddenly be jogged.

Christopher Chope: In conclusion, the figures show the success that has resulted from the introduction of rear seatbelt wearing, which was something that I was proud to be associated with as a Minister. I am glad that we have forced the Minister to justify the change that he is proposing.
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 - Using vehicle in dangerous condition etc.

Greg Knight: I beg to move amendment No. 36, in clause 21, page 24, line 39, at end insert
'and the offender was not an employee driving a vehicle owned by his employer in connection with his employment.'. 
I move this initially as a probing amendment to tease out of the Minister why he wants to make the change proposed in clause 21. Clause 21 would make disqualification for using a motor vehicle in a dangerous condition obligatory and not discretionary if the driver has committed a similar offence in the previous three years. Why should a good driver, who is not the owner of a vehicle but merely an employee, automatically lose his livelihood when there may be no culpability on his part? The courts should decide on the basis of the evidence before them, not be ordered by Parliament what view they should take on disqualification. Amendment No. 36 would seek to exempt any offender who was an employee driving a vehicle which was not his from the insistence that a second offender receives an obligatory ban. 
There are certain circumstances in which, if one is driving some else's vehicle in the course of your employment, one knows that there is something wrong with it. The most obvious example is that if the brakes are faulty, one immediately knows one is driving a dangerous vehicle. There are many other vehicle defects, however, which are weighty enough to make the vehicle dangerous, but which the driver may not know about, particularly if it is not his vehicle. For example, a badly corroded chassis would not be immediately evident to the driver of a vehicle. If it was a commercial vehicle with a tipping facility on the back, one would not necessarily know if the tipping mechanism was in a dangerous condition. Why should an employee lose his license—and thereby, perhaps, his whole livelihood—when it is entirely the fault of the person who employs him?

David Wilshire: I am listening to my right hon. Friend with much care because, when I looked at this, it struck me that if someone could not reasonably be expected to know, they are still going to be held responsible. If someone says, ''Well, I really could not have found out without stripping the vehicle down,'' they are still going to be prosecuted. Is that the situation without the amendment?

Greg Knight: As I read it, without the amendment, the courts would be faced with a position where, if the man had previously been convicted of the offence, he would have to be disqualified from driving, even if it was not his vehicle and he did not know that the vehicle was in a dangerous condition when he was stopped by the police. This could potentially—I put it no higher than that—cause an injustice to an employee working for an unscrupulous employer.
I hope the Minister will tell us why, on the face of it, he wants to put a provision in this Bill which could, in certain circumstances, be an attack on an innocent working man working for a ruthless employer who did not properly maintain his vehicles. The worker could find that he loses not only his license but his livelihood because, if his only trade is being a driver, he would be taken off the road and out of work. The disqualification should not automatically follow. We should still allow the courts to look at the evidence before them. If it was a fault which experts would say would not necessarily be apparent to the driver of the vehicle at the time, why should that man receive an immediate ban? 
I hope the Minister will respond to the real concerns that I have raised, which could, in some circumstances, lead to an injustice.

David Wilshire: I support my right hon. Friend. I wanted to be clear that I understood this, because it conjures up the example of the Royal Mail delivery offices in my constituency, with a large number of vans outside every morning. There is a relatively random choice of which van a driver uses on a given day—it could be any one of 20, 30 or 40 Post Office vehicles in the yard—and he gets into one in all good faith, believing that the Royal Mail is a responsible employer. I make no suggestion that it is not, because I am sure that it takes the greatest of care over their vehicles. Something could go wrong, however. A driver goes out with his mail to deliver, gets into a vehicle and off he goes. Unknown to him, it is faulty. It is a bit of a lottery. We cannot simply say that, because it is a second occasion, the person must have a track record of not bothering, so we should hold him responsible. It is a total lottery, because the same person could be caught twice out of a range of people and a range of vehicles.
It seems grossly unfair that a person cannot say ''I had no reason to know that''. I would not have a clue how to check every part of my car to see whether it was roadworthy. That is why I get it serviced. One cannot expect every person working for the Royal Mail to be an expert at checking vehicles. Therefore, it is a total lottery, which I believe is unfair. The defence, ''I could not reasonably have known in the circumstances'' should be available to individuals. 
Another thing that concerns me is that occasionally—how can I put it gently?—people who work for a firm like the opportunity to be difficult. We are handing people the opportunity to say, ''My job is to get into one of these vehicles, but I won't go out this morning until it has been checked over by somebody  to guarantee to me, because I am not an expert, that it is roadworthy''. The net result is that we are providing an opportunity for industrial strife, if anybody is looking for one. 
I know that both those issues are on the edge of what the Minister is trying to achieve. If a person were found to be blatantly doing something a second time, and it can be proved that they could and should have known and was being foolhardy at best, I should be with the Minister in saying that we must take serious steps to stop that. However, it can best be left to the court to decide whether it is somebody who is deliberately flouting the law or whose misfortune it was to get into the vehicle that morning, wholly unaware that it was not as unsafe as it turned out to be. I should be interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

Andrew Rosindell: I entirely endorse the remarks by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire (Mr. Knight) and my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire).
The labour market today is extremely flexible. People tend to take on jobs for short periods. Many of my constituents are drivers, driving vans and motor vehicles of all types throughout the week, often at different hours of the day, as well as at weekends and evenings. I find it worrying that, if the clause were accepted, many of them could lose their livelihoods, forfeiting the jobs that they depend on, because there is no flexibility. It makes sense to allow the courts to make a judgment in certain situations. If someone regularly offends and uses vehicles that are a danger not only to themselves but to the travelling public, the courts must act and appropriate penalties must be imposed, but to allow the clause to go on to the statute book without amendment would be irresponsible. Many people could be unfairly penalised. 
Many employers who use vehicles every day of the week, employing people on an ad hoc basis, sometimes have great difficulty ensuring that every vehicle is roadworthy. There will be occasions when a vehicle used by a short-term employee proves not to be. How can it be justified that the employee can lose everything as a result of an employer failing to ensure that his vehicles are properly maintained? 
I therefore endorse the amendment and hope that the Minister will address my points in his remarks.

David Jamieson: The clause amends the penalty for the offence of using a vehicle in a dangerous condition under section 40A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The effect of the change is that if a person commits the offence within three years of a previous conviction for the same offence, he must be disqualified for six months.
I had some sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's amendment when I first saw it and I was interested to know how the existing law operated, because we are simply making a small alteration to it. 
As I understand it, the police—in some cases it may be the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency—who may take one of these prosecutions forward are looking for the main culprit. In the circumstances that the hon. Members for Romford (Mr. Rosindell) and  for Spelthorne just mentioned, where a driver is allocated from a depot a vehicle that is in a dangerous condition—we are talking about serious defects, not just where a washer bottle is empty—the police would go for the main culprit. In this case it would be those who have responsibility for maintaining the vehicle and not the person who has walked into the depot to drive the vehicle. 
The purpose of amendment 36 is to provide that where the offender is an employee driving a vehicle owned by his employer in connection with his employment he should not be subjected to the higher penalty for the repeat offence. I understand what is behind this but I am not clear whether the right hon. Gentleman wants the test of the employee to apply for the first or the second incident of the offence, or both. I wholly agree that employees should not necessarily be held to account for the transgressions of the company for whom they work. Nevertheless, it is the case that a professional driver, even more so than the usual responsible motorist, should have regard to the state of the vehicle that he or she drives, for their own sake and for the duty of care to other road users. 
To commit the offence once may be a lack of diligence but to do it twice is approaching irresponsibility. The offence provides for the, 
''use, cause, or to permit another person to use a motor vehicle etc''. 
In this instance the case could be brought against the employer as they are permitting the use of the vehicle. Under the circumstances the prosecuting authorities would be concerned to deal with the actual person responsible for the dangerous condition of the vehicle in question. The private motorist has absolute responsibility for his own vehicle. It must be properly serviced and have the appropriate MOT certificate. The private motorist is also responsible for spotting a flat tyre or any deficiency in the vehicle. The vast majority do take this responsibility. But in the case that the right hon. Gentleman raises, there is not a case where drivers are being targeted rather than the employers, who are responsible for the vehicle. I have not had any complaint from the trade unions; were there any problems, they would certainly have raised them with me. 
For the benefit of the Committee I have to hand a copy of ''Wilkinson's Road Traffic Offences''. I am sure that this tome is regularly at the fingertips of the hon. Member for Christchurch.

David Wilshire: It is bedtime reading.

David Jamieson: Yes indeed, I am sure that he refers to it regularly. It says,
 ''In the case of section 40A,''— 
—he is talking about the motorist here. 
''he must prove that he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that the use of the vehicle involved a danger of injury to any person.'' 
That is a defence that one could present. An instance where that could not be used as a defence would be if a driver got into a vehicle where the windscreen was partly broken and was obscuring his view. On the other hand, if there was some deficiency in the vehicle  which would require it having a careful examination by an engineer, that would not be in the scope of what would be expected of a driver walking into a depot. 
The book goes on to say, 
 ''The effect of this is to exempt from endorsement, driving test and disqualification, including the penalty points disqualification . . . a driver who shows that he had taken out his vehicle in reliance on his foreman's or its owner's assurance that the brakes, steering etc., were in order.'' 
That is also a defence that could be presented. It continues: 
 ''It may well exempt sons and daughters who drive their parents' cars on the assumption that they are in good running order.'' 
Although, like the right hon. Gentleman, I was initially concerned about the matter, I am satisfied, first, that by habit and practice drivers are not being prosecuted for the sins of the employer and, secondly, that case law provides people who are so prosecuted with reasonable defences.

Greg Knight: I am grateful to the Minister for his comprehensive reply to the debate, which has been interesting and worth while. I take his point that the police will generally go for the main culprit. That is indeed my experience. However, in circumstances such as those I have outlined they would probably also want to prosecute the driver. Our concern is that a guilty verdict should not mean that a driver who did not know would be judicially hammered.
I take the Minister's point about ''Wilkinson's Road Traffic Offences'' showing where a defence would lie, and I can see that that might be of assistance in some cases. However, there is a problem, as my two hon. Friends suggested, when an employee is instructed to use a pool vehicle. It is highly unrealistic in those circumstances to expect that when an employee arrives at work each day and must drive a different vehicle he should insist that the foreman or someone else inspect it in his presence before he takes it out. 
Also, in cases involving vehicle pools, no assurance would be given that the vehicle was okay, which would amount to a defence. If a firm runs a fleet of vehicles most of them might be roadworthy. I am concerned that, if someone is convicted under the clause because the courts take the view that perhaps he should have inquired further, the courts should not be tied and should not have to take away his licence. 
I am grateful to the Minister for explaining that he is sympathetic to what we want to achieve. All that we want is to move the offender in such a case, who, on the face of it, is not culpable, from paragraph (a) to paragraph (b). We do not say that he should be let off scot-free, but we want his case to fall into the group over which the courts have discretion. The courts would not then be forced to deal with him in accordance with paragraph (a), which would mean taking his licence. 
I do not think that the Minister's argument runs contrary to ours. We are on the same side of the fence, but we differ in our conclusion about how best to handle such a case. It would do no harm, and might reassure trade unions and those who drive for a living, if the amendment were made. 
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived. 
Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 - Breach of requirements as to control of vehicle, mobile telephones etc.

Christopher Chope: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in clause 22, page 25, line 14, after 'vehicle', insert 'or pedal cycle'.

Peter Pike: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 14, in clause 22, page 25, line 18, at end add 'or pedal cycle'.

Christopher Chope: The amendment concerns the pedal cycle equivalence provision that I wish to incorporate into the Bill. From what the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the Member for Staffordshire, Moorlands (Charlotte Atkins) said in Transport questions on 21 December, she is already wedded to the amendment.
If people are cycling and using mobile phones at the same time, they present a hazard, not only to themselves but to other road users. Indeed, only last Saturday I was driving through the village of Bransgore in the New Forest and I had to spend quite a long time following a cyclist who was negotiating the bends while using his mobile phone. He was completely oblivious to the traffic conditions surrounding him and was putting himself at danger. Had he not been in front of such a careful, considerate and patient driver, there might well have been an accident. 
Ironically—and sadly—a fatality was caused in that same village last year as a result of a pedestrian using a mobile phone. She was so absorbed in the conversation that she stepped off the pavement into the path of another vehicle and was killed. We cannot legislate to require pedestrians not to use mobile phones. However, we can send out a strong message to all road users that the use of mobile phones can result in their not paying sufficient care and attention to what is happening and thereby putting themselves and others in danger. 
 ''It is already an offence to be in charge of a cycle while not properly in control of it. I would argue that using a mobile phone while cycling demonstrates that the cyclist is not cycling safely. I understand that Conservative Members occasionally use mobile phones while cycling.'' 
Perhaps some do, but certainly not me. The Minister continued: 
 ''I consulted my local community police officer, who informed me that he certainly considers cycling while using a mobile phone to be an unsafe practice.''—[Official Report, 21 December 2004; Vol. 428, c. 2048.] 
If cycling while using a mobile phone is an unsafe and undesirable practice and the Minister thinks that it is already a breach of the law, why should there be a specific offence that applies to motorists but no specific offence that applies to cyclists? I would be grateful for any explanation to justify such a distinction. 
The episode of the driver who was turning left while trying to catch up on her breakfast and eating an apple—following the Government's five-a-day principle, no doubt—was well reported in many newspapers, including the Daily Mail. The press response was one of surprise that the person concerned was committing an offence. The main outrage was that some £10,000 or more of public money was spent securing a conviction. 
If driving while eating an apple and not paying attention is equivalent to driving while using a mobile phone, reading a newspaper or whatever, why are we singling out one particular example, rather than relying on the generality of the construction and use regulations, which are currently the law? 
I fear that identifying a particular example as a specific offence might undermine the general message that people should have full control over their vehicles while they are driving and, indeed, full control over their bicycles while they are cycling. That is the import of the amendment, which would make it apparent that the Government accept that vulnerable road users, even though they do not happen to be at the wheel of a car, owe a duty to themselves and others.

Greg Knight: I rise to support the spirit of my hon. Friend's argument, and I look forward to the Minister's comments. There is growing concern among regular road users about the fact that cyclists seem to be able to behave with impunity whenever they are on the public highway.

David Jamieson: Some cyclists.

Greg Knight: Some cyclists; I stand properly corrected by the Minister. None the less, that ''some'' appears to be an ever-growing number. They not only use mobile phones, but ride after dark without lights and sail through red traffic lights as if traffic lights did not apply to them. While we in Parliament fine vehicle after vehicle to toughen up the penalties on those who drive them, the authorities appear to be ignoring the behaviour of cyclists; that, at least, is the perception.
I am not inviting the Minister to stray out of order, but it would help the Committee if he said whether the Government had a programme or a policy to ensure that cyclists who are a menace to themselves and others on the road properly obey the law and do not transgress in the way that they appear to be doing in ever-increasing numbers.

John Thurso: In replying, will the Minister consider whether the amendment goes far enough and whether a cyclist is permitted to use a hands-free mobile phone? The hon. Member for Christchurch related the tragic story of a pedestrian who was so distracted while having a conversation on a mobile phone that she walked in front of a vehicle. Will the Minister consider whether the same element of distraction does not apply equally to cyclists and, indeed, motorists? In that respect, my attention was brought this morning to the tragic case of a Mr. Saunders, who died 18 months after being hit by a car doing 70 mph on the A3. The driver was using a hands-free mobile and said that he did not see the cyclist until he was a couple of yards away. Will the Minister address that aspect of the amendment too?

David Wilshire: It gives me very great pleasure to support the Stanley Johnson amendment. It is not given to many people—assuming that the amendment is accepted—to change legislation before they become a Member of Parliament. I say that because I have little doubt that Stanley Johnson will be the next hon. Member for Teignbridge on 5 May, although what he says to his son when he gets here is another matter. I notice that the hon. Member for Teignbridge (Richard Younger-Ross)—these are his last few weeks in the House before we replace him—is not in his seat. It would be good if the person who currently represents Teignbridge indicated that he had full confidence in his successor.
That said, there is a crucial issue here. I appreciate that some cyclists have the view that their conduct is not, in itself, a particular problem. You may sometimes hear that pedestrians on pavements ought to get out of the way of cyclists. That sort of issue crops up from time to time. 
We have to be clear that, although the cyclist himself may not come to much harm if he does something stupid, the capacity for a stupid cyclist to cause mayhem among other people minding their own business is very great. It is not in the least unreasonable to say that they should be brought within the ambit of this regulation. If the argument runs that somebody driving a car while holding a telephone in their hands is a danger, then it ought to follow that a cyclist doing exactly the same thing is also a danger. I have no difficulty in supporting this amendment.

Andrew Rosindell: I endorse everything that has been said. Cyclists can be as much a danger as motor vehicle users when using a mobile telephone. There is no logic at all in the law applying to those driving motor vehicles, while those riding a bicycle are able to continue to use a so-called ''hands-free device''. There should be an overall review of the laws in relation to this, because there is no such thing as a hands-free device, as we all know from using hands-free mobile phones in our own motor cars. It often requires the user of the vehicle to press a button or touch the device at some point. There is a danger in that. Extending it those who use bicycles is logical and reasonable, and would add to safety for the cycle users themselves, as well as pedestrians and other road users.

Charlotte Atkins: This is the first time I have risen to speak in this Committee, and it would be remiss of me not to say what a pleasure it is to serve under your excellent chairmanship, Mr Pike.
I fully agree with hon. Members opposite. Cyclists should not use mobile phones while cycling. The Highway Code makes it absolutely clear that cyclists need to keep both hands on the handlebars, except when they need to signal or change gear. We have no evidence, however, that cyclists have caused accidents as the result of using a mobile phone. The hon. Member for Christchurch is clearly very unlucky to have come across cyclists who are using mobile phones and consistently do not cycle safely. Although cyclists certainly do break the law, there is no evidence of a need for particular legislation to stop cyclists using mobile phones. Plus, the cyclist is probably putting themselves at greater risk than they are other road users. A cycle is a relatively small vehicle which would probably cause damage to a pedestrian, but in the uneven battle between a car and a cyclist, the cyclist is far more likely to come off worst.

Andrew Rosindell: Is the hon. Lady suggesting that we should not also concern ourselves with the safety of cyclists? She makes a good point, that cyclists are going to be in danger if they use a mobile phone, which means taking their hands off the handlebars. Surely we should protect their interests as well.

Charlotte Atkins: Certainly, but we could also perhaps legislate for a cyclist eating an apple while riding their bicycle. It makes no more sense to do that than it does to legislate for their using a mobile phone. The police already have adequate powers to deal with cyclists who cycle dangerously. Let us make it clear that it is a minority of cyclists who cycle dangerously or carelessly. We have seen a growth in cycling, particularly on cycle paths and off-road. We are also ensuring that cyclists get proper training. We are introducing a new training regime to ensure both that people who are not used to cycling in traffic get appropriate training and that there is training for youngsters who cycle to school or near their homes. 
The important point is that we do not need to legislate to dissuade cyclists from using a mobile phone. Any cyclist should recognise that it is sensible to have both hands on the handlebars and to keep control of their bike. It is clear that police do not often prosecute cyclists but, under sections 28 and 29 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, they have the appropriate powers to take action against those who are cycling dangerously or carelessly. The penalty for dangerous cycling is a maximum fine of £2,500. For careless cycling, it is £1,000. Those are more than adequate penalties. 
The amendments do not work as amendments because the construction and use regulations of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986, made under section 41 of the 1988 Act, do not contain requirements that prohibit the riding of a pedal cycle when using a hand-held mobile phone. Therefore, there is nothing against which the offence of contravening the regulations could be applied. That is a technical issue. 
I do not believe that we need to take action against a cyclist using a mobile phone. We need to train cyclists and get them to understand not to drive dangerously, whether by holding a mobile phone, eating an apple or, as often happens, cycling on pavements and going through red lights. We must create a culture in which cyclists understand that they too must obey the rules of the road. They can be dangerous. Cyclists who cycle in that way give a poor example to those youngsters we are trying to encourage to take up cycling because it is healthy exercise and helps to combat obesity. I hope that the work that we are doing in Government will encourage people to take to cycling, both to get to work and for leisure purposes. It can be a pleasurable activity but only if people take the appropriate steps to ensure that they are cycling safely, and not putting themselves, pedestrians or, indeed, motorists at risk by creating conditions in which accidents can occur.

John Thurso: The Minister is making an excellent argument in favour of why the amendment should not be accepted. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) is not in place to hear this excellent argument. However, on the point that she makes about cycle paths, is it not the case that concentrating on separating cyclists from the road wherever possible is the best possible way of achieving safety?

Charlotte Atkins: That is true. I often find it strange that cycles can go into bus lanes. As someone who has cycled in London quite a lot, particularly in the borough of Wandsworth, which the hon. Member for Christchurch knows well, the idea of cycling in a bus lane seems to me somewhat suicidal because a bus is rather larger than a car. I have been pushed off a bicycle; as I was cycling to a hospital, as it happens. It is important to try to separate bicycles from cars. Increasingly, as more and more people take bikes on to  the roads, particularly in places such as London where a critical mass has been reached, motorists are noticing cyclists more than in the past. It is becoming safer for cyclists, because they are being noticed. We must recognise, however, that we will all—cyclists and, indeed, motorists—have to be much more considerate on the roads.

Christopher Chope: What the Minister said contains, as one would expect, a lot of common sense. One expects that from people who used to serve on Wandsworth council, as she did. However, I am not sure that the common sense she has articulated is shared by all the cycling fraternity. There seems to be a feeling—reflected in some of the press comment when we let it be known that we would be tabling the amendment—that they are not doing anything wrong when cycling and using a mobile phone. The point that the hon. Lady makes is that by that sort of behaviour they are more likely to cause injury to themselves than to other road users, but surely the same argument applies to seatbelt laws. Adults who fail to put on seatbelts are normally jeopardising their own safety, rather than the safety of others. We have a responsibility as a legislature to ensure that there are laws that result in a reduction in the number of injuries and fatalities on our roads.
The Minister has not explained why she believes that there should be a specific offence of driving while using a mobile phone that carries a mandatory endorsement for motorists, but no specific offence of cycling while using a mobile phone. I do not understand the comparison. Driving while using a mobile phone is a serious issue, and the Government are addressing that with a specific penalty, although one could say that it is only one of a type of behaviour that incorporates not taking proper care of one's own safety while travelling on the road. However, exactly the same principles surely apply to cyclists. Either it is wrong that both cyclists and drivers should have that particular offence specified as an example and used against them, or it is right that we should single out that offence as an example because it is so widespread; probably more widespread than eating apples at the wheel. One can see that there may be an argument for a specific offence, but surely that argument applies just as much to cyclists as it does to drivers. 
I am not convinced by the Minister's argument that, because the consequence of that behaviour is likely to result only in damage to the cyclist, rather than other road users, it is less unacceptable. She said that there is no evidence that cyclists cause accidents while using mobile phones. I have anecdotal evidence from my constituency that people feel intimidated by cyclists who are using pavements and mobile phones at the same time. If the police were going to give cyclists a fixed penalty, it would be much easier if they had a specific offence with which they could charge the cyclist, rather than having to go to enormous expense, perhaps using helicopters, to establish that the cyclist was causing a danger to themselves or others.

Charlotte Atkins: The point is that there is no body of evidence to demonstrate that cyclists using mobile phones are creating a problem. There is a huge body of evidence to demonstrate that motorists, whatever vehicle they are driving, using mobile phones create problems and accidents. That is why the clause suggests that we should make such an offence endorseable. However, there is anecdotal comment about cyclists causing a problem because they are driving dangerously or carelessly. That may or may not be as the result of holding a mobile phone. Unfortunately, I probably have more complaints from people about cyclists going through red lights than about those using mobile phones. Careless or dangerous driving by cyclists is usually related to other offences such as jumping lights or cycling on pavements. Use of mobile phones by cyclists is not a big problem, because that would be very dangerous for the cyclist; much more so than other offences that they might commit. That is why I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Christopher Chope: I am grateful to the Minister for her response. Unfortunately, it is not consistent with what she said on 21 December. She said:
 ''I would argue that using a mobile phone while cycling demonstrates that the cyclist is not cycling safely.''—[Official Report, 21 December 2004; Vol. , c. 2048.] 
She did not say that there was no evidence that there were unsafe consequences resulting from that behaviour. She seemed to accept that there were cyclists cycling while using mobile phones.

Charlotte Atkins: They can be prosecuted under sections 28 and 29 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

Christopher Chope: In exactly the same way, motorists who are using mobile phones can be prosecuted. There is a lot to be said for equivalence. There is a feeling among some road users about actions of the cycling fraternity, or at least some of them. I do not want to generalise or make people think that I am prejudiced against cyclists. That is not true, because I am a cyclist. The fact that, many years ago, a cyclist coming down a one-way street in the wrong direction hit my wife and her dog does not mean I have a longstanding resentment against all cyclists. On that occasion, the cycle touring club were generous enough to write us a letter, expressing sympathy over the behaviour of that cyclist.
However, I believe that it is important that all road users should recognise a degree of equivalence. There is nothing more annoying for a motorist than to see a cyclist with a mobile phone cycling along with impunity, when he knows that if he were to use a mobile phone, he would be slapped down with a fixed penalty and an endorsement. The argument for equivalence is a strong one, and I hope that other Committee members will support me. 
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 13.

Question accordingly negatived.

Christopher Chope: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in clause 22, page 25, line 23, at end insert
'except in circumstances where a motor vehicle is stationary and the engine is switched off.'. 
This is a common-sense amendment that will appeal to all members of the Committee. It makes clear that someone using a mobile phone in a stationary vehicle with the engine switched off would not be guilty of an offence. I am concerned that the present law, because of the wide definition of the expression ''driving'' in road traffic legislation, could mean that people who get stuck in long traffic jams, switch off their engines and communicate with others to inform them of the delay will, strictly speaking, be committing an offence. 
The law is brought into disrepute if we allow offences to go on to the statute book that everyone realises are an absolute nonsense. The injustice is even greater where there is no power to mitigate the fixed penalties, as there is not for the proposed offence in question, which will result in a mandatory minimum three-point endorsement on a licence. I am sure the Government do not intend to penalise motorists who are stuck in traffic jams, but the way to ensure they do not do so is to amend the law now to ensure that that is apparent on the face of the statute. It is a simple point, and I hope the Government will be able to accept my reasonable amendment.

Charlotte Atkins: The amendment is unnecessary. I am not aware of any driver being prosecuted for the situation described by the hon. Member's amendment; namely, failing to have proper control of a vehicle when using a hand-held mobile phone if they are stationary with the engine switched off. In such a situation we do not need to be as prescriptive as the hon. Member suggests. In fact, if a motorist receives a phone call and wants to take it, we advise that they pull over to the side of the road, where it is safe, turn off the engine and return the call. The term ''driving'', to which the hon. Member referred, is used in much road traffic legislation without further definition.
It is appropriate for the courts to take into account the circumstances of the case when deciding if an offence has been committed, rather than us trying to set that out in legislation. For instance, if a traffic light went red as a motorist approached it and they  momentarily turned off the engine, I would not consider that to be the right time to use a mobile phone. However, if someone is stuck in a five-mile tailback because of an accident on the motorway and all the vehicles around them are stationary with their engines turned off, clearly it is fine to use a mobile phone, because the motorist is not about to drive off. Ultimately, it is not for the Department to interpret the law. It must be for the police officer on the spot to decide whether an offence has been committed. If a driver wishes to contest that, he has the chance to do so in court. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment. It is not necessary and any sensible person would recognise that if the car is stationary and the engine is turned off, no offence will be committed.

John Thurso: I was minded not to support the amendment until I listened to the Minister. She has persuaded me of the opposite case. Rather than adding clarity to what I thought was a clear situation, obfuscation has crept in. She said that it would be quite wrong sitting at a red traffic light. On the A9 at Berriedale late last year, thanks to the good offices of my friend the Transport Minister in the Scottish Executive, some excellent roadworks were undertaken. However, that meant that one sat for 15 to 20 minutes, particularly late at night, waiting for the vehicles to go up and down. We all knew that and were all happy with it, because we knew the good results that we would get. Frankly, when there was a red light we all switched our engines off to conserve fuel, which is very expensive in the north, and might well have made a telephone call. That is a circumstance that is in direct contravention to the one that she put forward.
I would have thought that since the purpose of the legislation is to stop people driving inattentively, and hitting things while they are moving, if the engine is switched off that cannot happen and therefore the amendment might have some use after all.

Charlotte Atkins: Clearly, in such circumstances no police officer would prosecute a motorist simply because there was a long wait. I was referring to the  idea that someone could get round the legislation by momentarily turning off the engine and then picking up the mobile phone, and saying, ''But officer, the car's engine is no longer running and I was therefore safely using my mobile phone.'' A situation where one expects to be waiting in line for 15 minutes or more is totally different.

Mark Fisher: Taking the Minister's reply, if a vehicle is stationary and the engine is switched off, whether the intention is to be there for several minutes or just a minute or two, an traffic offence cannot be being committed. I am persuaded by the comments made by the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross. I do not see that the time, or the fact that one is in a long queue, is actually relevant. The lack of power and lack of movement of the vehicle is what is relevant.

Charlotte Atkins: No, I appreciate my hon. Friend's point. The point that I was making is that someone should not simply turn off the engine once they see a police officer approaching, and say that they are not guilty because the engine is turned off. If the engine is turned off to conserve energy because the driver is going nowhere, it is rather a different situation from one in which the engine is turned off for 15 seconds or so, so that the driver would not be guilty of an offence. That is the issue. The engine might be momentarily turned off, or in the case of an electric car, it might have turned itself off to conserve energy. The point is that at any one time, if one is driving a motor car, one wants to be aware of the road conditions and what is happening at that particular time and should not turn off the engine for 15 seconds when one is proceeding down the road. One should be focusing on driving carefully rather than using a mobile phone.

Mark Fisher: I do not want to labour the point, but is not an engine being on or off rather like the word ''unique''? We cannot have degrees of an engine being off. If it is off, it is off.
It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
Adjourned till Tuesday 1 February at twenty-five minutes past Nine o'clock.